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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
On March 21, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) .x 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether Images may raise arguments and issues on 
appeal regarding alleged fraudulent misrepresentations which were 
not presented to the trial court/ which were not preserved before 
the court below; which cannot form the basis of a fraud claim; 
which were decided against Images in a parallel arbitration 
proceeding; and which are barred by the proper application of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine.2 
II. Whether the trial court's finding that Macris was 
not the agent of Macris & Associates, Inc. ("M&A") and/or that 
M&A was not the alter ego of Macris may be reversed when Images 
has failed to marshal the substantial evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings, and when other unchallenged findings 
render the agency/alter ego question moot. 
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding testimony of William Crismon when Images violated the 
court's order and failed to identify him as a witness for more 
than one month after the discovery cut-off date even though it 
1
 Not § 78-2a-3(k) [sic] as alleged in Appellant's Brief. 
2
 Not res judicata as alleged in Appellant's Brief. 
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knew of Mr. Crismon and could have identified him as a witness, 
when Images failed to proff€>r his testimony when the trial court 
subsequently allowed other previously excluded witnesses' 
testimony, and when William Crismon's testimony would only have 
been cumulative of other testimony. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The few determinative Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
are set forth below. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection.• In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from 
the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked. 
This Rule is dispositive of the third issue on appeal 
since Images did not make a proffer of William Crismon's 
testimony. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in relevant part: 
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(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If 
a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under 
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party 
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the 
court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others the following: 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or 
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in 
evidence; . . . . 
This Rule is dispositive of the issue regarding William 
Crismon's exclusion as a trial witness because Images failed to 
comply with the trial court's discovery order. 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the 
order indicated: 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, 
including for each issue: the standard of appellate 
review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court; or . . . . 
Rule is dispositive of most of the issues on this 
Images has failed to comply with this provision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is yet another chapter in a series of long, 
multiple, tortuous proceedings undertaken by Images to avoid 
paying what Images repeatedly has been found liable for in at 
This 
appeal because 
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least two separate arbitration proceedings and one trial. In 
each of those proceedings, it was found that Images breached the 
subject contracts with Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") and Macris & 
Associates, Inc. ("M&A"); Images was not fraudulently induced to 
enter into contracts with either of those entities; and Images 
owes substantial damages to both Affinity and M&A. 
The essential facts of this case are clearly and 
succinctly set out in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, a copy of which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit I.3 
Briefly stated, in the spring of 1989, Images' President, Thomas 
Mower ("Mower"), entered into negotiations with Michael Macris 
("Macris"), who was acting on behalf of two separate 
corporations, Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") and Macris & 
Associates, Inc. ("M&A")*. Appellant's Brief at 6-7. Images 
concedes that as a result of those negotiations, it entered into 
two related contracts: a supply contract with Affinity (the 
"Affinity Contract") whereby Affinity would supply nail gels and 
special curing lamps for artificial nails, and a distributorship 
contract and addendum thereto with M&A (the "M&A Contract") 
wherein M&A would be allowed to participate as a distributor, 
principally to market the nail products, in Images' multilevel 
marketing program and would be "auto-qualified" to receive 
3
 Hereinafter, references to the relevant Findings of Fact 
are referred to as "Finding(s)." 
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compensation as a "presidential" distributor without having to 
meet any of the usual qualifications for receiving compensation 
a x ti lat: ] eve] See id . at: 7 8 . 
Withi n a short period of time, trouble developed 
between Images and both companies wi t:h which Maoris was 
a s s o c i a t: e d . S e v e r a ] t i n i e s :i i i 1 9 9 0 11 n a g e s s t o p p e d m a k i n g 
payments to M&A as a distributor, unilaterally withdrew 
dIst ributors from M&A ' s "downIine" organi z at ion, and threatened 
t e i m i i i a t: i o r I D f t: 1: i e M & A C o i 11: i a c t:, 11: i i a g e s 1; :i t: 1 I d i: e w t h e s e a t: t: e m p t e d 
terminations. See Memorandum Decision copy attached to the 
Appendix as Exhibit 2 at ]\ 1 7. 
' rhe parties sparred, with one another, but no 
resolutions ox thei r disputes were reached 0'n March 7 , 1991, 
Images advise d M & A t h a t i t w a s d i s c o n t i n i :i :i i I g t ]: i e a i 11 o -
qualification status of the distributorship for lack of activity. 
This constituted a material breach of the M&A Contract by Images. 
F:i ndii lg N D 3 7 0: i • : r aboi it: Mar ::h 2 9 1 99] Ii nages advised MS A 
that It was considering terminating the distributorship entirely, 
not just its auto-qualification status, citing a number of 
p i i r p o r t e d r e a s o n s S e e F i n d i n g s N o s . ± 1 a i i • :I 4 2 " I" h 5 t: r :i a 1 c o i 11 t: 
found these reasons to be without merit, pretextual and not 
justifying termination. Ld. Of particular significance to this 
a p p e a 1, n o n e o f t: h e p u r p o r t e d r e a s c i i s f c r i : . - . . . n ' 3 
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or termination of the M&A Contract included any alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentations by Macris. 
On April 17, 1991, M&A filed suit alleging that Images 
breached the M&A Contract. It is this action which is now on 
appeal. This matter is hereinafter referred to as "the M&A 
Litigation." 
Affinity, Macris' other company supplying (a) nail gels 
activated by ultraviolet light and (b) lamp housings to Images, 
initiated an arbitration proceeding, Affinity, Inc. v. Images 
International, Inc. alleging breach of contract. In May, 1992, 
the Arbitrator found that Images breached its contract with 
Affinity and awarded damages of $144,313 to Affinity. (See R. 
834-35.) On June 19, 1992, this arbitration award was entered as 
a judgment in the Fourth'Judicial District Court for Utah County, 
State of Utah, in the matter of Affinity, Inc. v. Images 
International, Inc., Civ. No. 92-9400015 (Harding, J.).4 (See 
R. 834 at H 7.) 
After the attempted execution on the arbitration award, 
Images further complicated the legal proceedings by filing a 
4
 When Affinity sought to execute on its judgment by 
seizing Images' assets, Images delayed such execution by 
producing documentation that the assets being seized were owned 
by a third party. Affinity subsequently proved that this 
document was a fabrication which was back-dated and falsely 
notarized by Mower's mother-in-law. (See R. 833-34 at HH 7, 12 
and 14.) Based on this information, the court lifted the stay of 
execution. (Id. at H 15.) 
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complaint in the Fourth J udicial District Court for Utah County, 
State of Utah (Images & Attitudes, Inc., et al. v. Affinity, 
Inc . , et al C. i < N : • 9 2 0 4 0 0 4 74 (Pa:i : ] : J ) E J 1 eging thai ., i 1 
had been fraudulently induced to enter into the Affinity 
Contract; and asking that the arbitration award and judgment in 
A f f i i I :i t A, > e s e t a s i d e . J \ i d g e P a i k s i i b s e q u e n t ] y s t a y e d 
that action pending the completion of mandatory arbitration. 
Images then filed two separate arbitration proceedings which were 
s u b s e que i 111 y c • :> i i s o ] :i d a t e d a s E c 1 a t, 11 I c ,. , f / k./ a 11 n a a e s v ,. 
Affinity, Inc. , Consolidated Nos. 81 818 0 0 2 6 93 and 81 - 181006092 
(American Arbitration Association) (Verhaaren, Arb.) (herei nafter 
ref erre< I i : : > « i: ; • "  1 1: I e A f f i r i:i • :y Ai 1: »i t r at: i oi i''") See R . 8 3 4 , 5 ] 52 . 
In the course of the Affinity Arbitration and the M&A 
Litigation, Images5 claimed that it had beei i fraudulently 
induced to enter into each of the two contracts by Maoris' 
allegedly false statements to Mower during the negotiation of the 
two contracts (R 1 1 90 284 86 . ) See also Appe] ] ant ' s Bi: i ef at 
7 - 8 .6 In t he t ri a1 cou r t b e1ow, Images' affirmative claim o f 
"fraudulent inducement" was first contained in its September 10, 
1992 Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against: M& A 
In actuality, in the M&A Litigation, Images and Mower 
asserted claims against M&A and Macris. For the sake of brevity, 
Images and Mower are referred to collectively as "Images." 
6
 Indeed, on pages 7 and 8 of its Appellant's Brief, Images 
continues to assert that both of the contracts were fraudulently 
induced. 
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and Maoris. (R. 281-294.) Therein, Images alleged that Maoris 
represented that a Dr. Lyman invented the nail gel system being 
supplied and that Maoris had $250,000 of advertising in place. 
(See R. 285-286.) No allegation was made, as is now asserted on 
appeal, that Macris represented he would recruit "big hitters." 
In an October 12, 1992 Memorandum, Images contended 
that fraudulent representations regarding "an [sic] National 
Inquirer [sic] advertising campaign was forthcoming, and the 
misrepresentation as to the quality and composition of the newly 
developed" nail gel induced Images to enter into the M&A 
Contract. No claim was made that Macris misrepresented his 
ability to get "big hitters." 
In a February 22, 1990 letter from Mower to Macris at 
Affinity, Inc. (R. 884-888), Mower confirmed that this same 
representation regarding advertising in the National Enquirer 
induced Images to enter into the Affinity Contract: 
You then approached Images with a proposal to market 
the [nail] system through a nationwide advertising 
campaign beginning with the prestigious National 
Enquirer magazine . . . Images issued the [purchase 
order to Affinity] and made an enormous financial 
commitment. This was based on two items and two items 
only. 
1. The systems would be ran [sic] in the Enquirer 
and other publications. 
2. The Enquirer article was to be in 
October . . . . 
Let me make one point crystal clear . . . Images 
took on the line and made that extraordinarily large 
38560 8 
purchase because of one and ONLY ONE THING. The fact 
that you proposed the National Enquirer deal to 
i is 
Ten months after the filing of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Images responded t:c :i i 11:errogatori es wh:i c 1 ] re• :j\ ii r e d 
Images to provide the details of its fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim. (See R. 1097-1102.) Numerous alleged representations 
w e r e i d e n t i f i e d :i n c ] i i i i n g ' •' • - • :i i I g t : D r L y rn a i I a n d 
advertising with the National Enquirer. Notably , no contention 
was made that Macr:i s represented that he wouId recruit "big 
1 ij Iters " to become di stri bi itors of linages " ± i u> in :t ^  . 
On September 23, 1993, Mower submitted an affidavit to 
the trial court wherein he admi tted that th^ alleged 
t i 11 si epreser Itat ioi Is r egar dii ig D] : I »\ i i: iai i s :i i iv o 1 v e m e n t w i t h t:he 
nail system and the purported advertising worth $2,000,000 to 
$2, 500, 000 w:i t:h the National Enquirer were made prior to entering 
:i i 11: : 11 i e A f f i i I 1t y c • D n t r a c t: (w h i c h preceded the M & A contract), and 
induced him to enter into both contracts, (See R. 794-79'; ) 
(See a l s o R . 10 0 9 at: *|*I 6 a n d ' 7 ) Aga i n i 10 c] a i m of f ra i idi A e n t 
inducement was made based upon any alleged representation 
regarding recruitment of "big hitters A' 
While these proceedings were going or i In the M&A 
Litigation, the Affinity Arbitration was also progressing. On 
November 8, 1993, the arbitrator dismissed with prejudice Images' 
38560 9 
claim that Images had been fraudulently induced to enter into a 
contract with Affinity. The arbitrator held that: 
Affinity made no misrepresentations of 
material facts to [Images] to induce [Images] 
to enter into the Agreement and [Images], in 
any event, did not reasonably rely on the 
alleged misrepresentations. 
(R. 1214.) 
Images then filed a Motion for Modification of Order 
with the arbitrator, arguing that the above-quoted language 
should be stricken from the arbitrator's Order of Dismissal. It 
made a critical admission for the purposes of the instant appeal, 
i.e., that the arbitrator's ruling would collaterally estop it 
from asserting a fraudulent inducement claim in the M&A 
Litigation. (See R. 1222-1223.) 
The arbitrator denied Images' Motion for Modification 
of Order, and again held that: "the Affidavits filed by the 
parties amply demonstrate that Affinity made no 
misrepresentations of material facts to [Images] to induce 
[Images] to enter into the agreement and that [Images] did not, 
in any event, reasonably rely on the alleged misrepresentations." 
(R. 1210.) 
On December 11, 1993, M&A filed a Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in the M&A 
Litigation advising the trial court of the arbitrator's Order of 
dismissal in the Affinity Arbitration and arguing that Images' 
38560 10 
fraudulent inducement claims were barred under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. (R. 1188.) More specifically, M&A argued 
that Images had not" asserted any fiarf.s in support ^f it:1: 
fraudulent inducement claim :i n the M&A Litigation which "were not 
set forth or raised in its memoranda or oral argument in" the 
Affini ty Arbil ration i i- I i T! ) . at: t:l le :i ssue :)f fraudu .-. .. 
inducement had been lully, fairly, and completely litigated to a 
final judgment in that, .action (R 13 83-86.) Thi is, Images shoul d 
. ..' p e d f i c i t t r e 1 i t i g a t: i i i g f i: a u d u 1 e i I t: i i i d u c e m e i 11. 
espon "e to that: si lpplemental memorandum, Images 
L-.-.-.-. -. .*.--. ... . :i i i Support: of Defendai its' Motion to Strike 
and in Copesition to Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Maoris 
& Assoc!ires, Inc.' - and Mike Maoris' Motion for summary Judgment 
Regarding : r a u j . _ : / Inducement. (R 1 195-1206. ) Therein, 
Images raised three arguments before the t:r ial court in 
o p p o s i t i o n t: : • M & A ' , s :: • D ] ] a t: e r a ] e s t o p p e 1 a r g i i m e n t:, :> n 1 } • o n e :> f 
which it pursues on this appeal.7 That argument is that 
Images first argued that the supplemental memorandum in 
which M&A raised its collateral estoppel argument was not 
authorized under Rule 4-501(1)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and that M&A's Supplemental Memorandum, together 
with its collateral estoppel argument, must be stricken. (R. 
1203-1205.) The trial court rejected this argument, holding that 
striking the Supplemental Memorandum "would result in keeping 
relevant information from this Court that is dispositive of 
issues before this Court." (R. 1234.) Images does not appeal 
this decision. 
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the issue of fraudulent inducement was not 
fully and fairly litigated in the 
arbitration, thereby precluding the 
application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in this matter. . . . [because 
Images' fraudulent inducement claim in the 
Affinity Arbitration had been dismissed] at 
the summary judgment stage, before any 
testimony was allowed . . . . 
(R. 1200-1201.) 
Images did not argue to the trial court that the 
fraudulent inducement issues in the Affinity Arbitration were 
different than the fraudulent inducement issues in the MScA 
Litigation as it does now on this appeal. In fact, as 
demonstrated above, Images had repeatedly contended that the same 
alleged misrepresentations by Macris had induced it to enter into 
both the Affinity Contract and the M&A Contract. 
Based upon the-record and arguments before it, the 
trial court rejected Images' argument against collateral 
estoppel, properly holding that "[c]ollateral estoppel applies to 
issues decided on summary judgment;" and "to issues decided in 
arbitration proceedings." (R. 1233.) The trial court then 
Images next argued that M&A's collateral estoppel 
argument was premature because (as noted in the text above) 
Images had filed a Motion for Modification in the Affinity 
Arbitration, asking the arbitrator to modify his Order of 
Dismissal in such a way that Images would not be collaterally 
estopped from relitigating tne issue of fraudulent inducement. 
(R. 1201-1203.) This argument, however, was completely mooted 
when the arbitrator denied Images' Motion for Modification, as 
discussed in the text above. Images does not pursue its 
"prematurity" argument on this appeal. 
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gr ai i t e d M&A' s n L :)t::i : i i f 01 si n i: LI i tai : \ j udg n lei i t a s t: : • It i l ages • 
fraudulent inducement counterclaim, finding that 
the prior judgment against the Defendants on 
the issue of whether Mr. Maoris,, whether 
acting as an agent for Macris & Associates, 
Inc. or Affinity, Inc., fraudulently induced 
Images & Attitude, Inc. need not be re-
litigated in this action, . . . The issue as 
to whether Mr. Macris fraudulently induced 
the Defendants has already been fully and 
fairly litigated in a prior arbitration 
proceeding. . . . The prior arbitration 
proceeding found that no fraudulent 
inducement had occurred. 
(Id.) 
T h e t: r :i a 3; • : i i t: h e i e m a i i 1 i n g :i s s i i e s w a s h e ] d £ r o m 
February 16, 1996 to March 27, 1 996. Durii ig the trial, the lower 
court issued an order that William Crismon and others woul d not 
b e a 11 o w e d t c • t e s t :i f y b e c a u s e I m ai g e s 1 i a d f a i I e d t: • : i :I e i I t: ;i f y I: :i :i i: i: i 
and six other individuals as witnesses until a month after 
discovery had. closed even though the interrogatory requesting 
s u c I i i d e i 111 f i c a t: i • :D I :i I I a d ] o i i g b e e i I p r e \ i o u s ] y p i o p o \ i n d e d, t: 1: i e 
court had ordered such list to be supplemented, Images previously 
had supplemented i t s wit ne ss 1is t w i t hout i dent i f ying Cri smon and 
the o 11 I e r s :i x :i i i d i 1; i :I u a 1 s a s w i t: i I esse s ; I rn a g e s k n e w o £ C r i s m o n ' s 
existence and intended to call him as a witness. ' Despite its 
prior ruling, the lower court later allowed two of the three 
:
' Images voluntarily dropped three witnesses when its 
slander claims were dismissed, and the court allowed one witness 
to be called. 
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previously excluded witnesses to provide testimony on rebuttal. 
Absent from the record is any indication that Images made a 
proffer as to what William Crismon's testimony would have been or 
why it was otherwise important for him to testify. 
After hearing the testimony, reviewing the exhibits, 
and considering proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
from both parties, the trial court issued its Memorandum Opinion 
and subsequently entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment9 in favor of M&A. The trial court held in favor 
of M&A in all respects that M&A performed its obligations under 
the M&A Contract and against Images on the counterclaim and 
third-party complaint holding that M&A did not breach the M&A 
Contract in any manner alleged by Images. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Images has raised three principal issues on appeal. 
Only one of Images' arguments was properly preserved for appeal 
before the lower court, and none of the contentions has merit, 
either legally or factually. 
The trial court's ruling that Images is barred from 
asserting fraudulent inducement claims because of collateral 
estoppel or issue preclusion should be affirmed for a number of 
reasons. First, Images never argued to the trial court that the 
fraudulent inducement issues in the Affinity Arbitration were 
9
 The Judgment is attached to the Appendix as Exhibit 3. 
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different than those in the M&A Litigation and has thus waived 
that objection. Second, contrary to the contentions now made on 
appeal, Images has repeatedly and consistently contended that the 
same misrepresentations induced it to enter into both the 
Affinity Contract and the M&A Contract; thus, Images had the 
opportunity to fully litigate all claims of fraudulent 
inducement. Third, the arbitrator decided that there were no 
material misrepresentations upon which Images reasonably relied. 
Fourth, the "big hitter" representation, which was not timely 
presented to the lower court, cannot even be the basis of a fraud 
claim. Fifth, Images does not contend that it was denied the 
opportunity to present affidavits or arguments to the arbitrator 
prior to his ruling on Affinity's motion for summary judgment on 
the fraudulent inducement issue. Thus, Images had a full, fair 
and complete opportunity to present its arguments regarding 
fraudulent inducement and is now collaterally estopped from 
raising the fraudulent inducement issue against M&A. 
The trial court's findings that Macris was not acting 
as the agent of M&A when he started another network marketing 
company, Emily Rose, Inc., or engaged in other unspecified acts 
and/or that M&A was not the "alter ego" of Macris should be 
affirmed. In challenging those findings, Images fails to marshal 
the substantial evidence supporting the trial court's rulings. 
Moreover, Images' arguments ignore other unchallenged findings 
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which render the alter ego/agency question moot, i.e. that Images 
materially breached its contract with M&A and that because of 
that prior material breach, Macris, M&A, Emily Rose, Inc. or any 
other entity with which Macris may have been associated was free 
to compete directly with Images. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding the testimony of William Crismon. The record is 
clear that Crismon, as well as six other witnesses, were 
precluded from testifying at trial as a discovery sanction 
resulting from Images' failure to identify them in response to a 
court order until a month after the discovery cut-off date. 
Despite that ruling, the trial court later allowed at least three 
of the four remaining witnesses to testify on rebuttal. There is 
nothing in the record indicating that Images' proffered William 
Crismon's testimony to the lower court or explained why his 
testimony would add anything to the testimony of Thomas Crismon, 
his brother and business partner, who did provide testimony. 
For these reasons, as more fully addressed herein, the 
trial court's rulings should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DISMISS IMAGES' FRAUDULENT 
INDUCEMENT COUNTERCLAIM 
A The "Correctness" Standard Of Review Only Applies 
To Matters Properly Before This Court 
Images contends that the trial court's summary judgment 
finding should be reviewed under "a correctness standard," and 
that "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" 
should be viewed "in the light most favorable to" Images. 
Appellant's Brief at 14. However, the "correctness standard" 
applies only to those issues which Images properly raised before 
the trial court Images may not ask this Court to reverse the 
trial court on the basis of an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Rocky Mt Thrift v Salt Lake City Corp , 887 P.2d 
848, 850 (Utah 1994) (refusing to consider new negligence 
theories which "were not raised before the trial court and may 
not now be raised"), Cowen and Co v Atlas Stock Transfer Co , 
695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984) (on an appeal from summary 
judgment, the appellant may not "raise issues that were not 
raised to the trial court and proffer facts to support those 
issues on appeal"). Likewise, the "all reasonable inferences" 
standard applies only to those facts which were properly in the 
record before the trial court at the time it ruled on the 
collateral estoppel issue. Govert Copier Painting v Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P 2d 163, 170 (Utah App 1990) ("We will not 
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consider facts on appeal when there is no record the trial judge 
had access to those facts when deciding the motion at issue."); 
Seare v. University of Utah School of Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 676 
n.4 (Utah App. 1994) (M[I]n reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment 'we consider only the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits properly 
before the trial judge.'") (citation omitted). 
As demonstrated below, only one of Images' three 
arguments regarding collateral estoppel was ever raised with the 
trial court, and thereby properly preserved for appeal; that 
argument, however, lacks any legal merit. Images' remaining two 
arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, are predicated 
on facts that were not part of the record before the trial court, 
and ignore the law of collateral estoppel. 
13* Images Is Barred From Raising Arguments On Appeal 
Which It Failed To Present To The Lower Court. 
Images now asserts that there were two fraudulent 
misrepresentations inducing the M&A Contract which were different 
from the fraudulent inducement claims in the Affinity 
Arbitration: (1) the National Enquirer advertising and (2) some 
vague references to Macris' "ability to bring in 'big hitters.'" 
See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at p. 11. Thus, Images argues that 
the trial court erred in applying collateral estoppel. See 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 17-19, 21-22. Images, however, never 
raised this argument in any pleading, in any affidavit, or in any 
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interrogatory answer. Most importantly, in its opposition papers 
to M&A's argument that the fraudulent inducement claim was barred 
by collateral estoppel, Images never advised the lower court that 
the fraudulent inducement issues were allegedly different. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Images has violated Utah 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by not 
citing where in the record this alleged error was preserved. 
1. Images may not question, for the first time 
on this appeal, whether or not the alleged 
fraudulent inducement issues in the two 
proceedings were identical. 
By failing to give the trial court the opportunity to 
rule on the question of whether the fraudulent inducement issues 
were the same in the Affinity Arbitration and the M&A Litigation, 
Images failed to preserve it for appeal. See Rocky Mt., 887 P.2d 
at 850 (issues not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal); Cowen, 695 P.2d 109 at 113-14 (Utah 1984) 
(appellant from summary judgment may not "raise issues that were 
not raised to the trial court and proffer facts to support those 
issues on appeal")/ see also Aldrich and Steinberger v. Martin, 
837 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1992) (The fact that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel was before the trial court "does 
not preserve for review any and all aspects of [that] doctrine[] 
that [the appellant] chooses to raise on appeal. Only the theory 
expressly raised, that of privity, was properly preserved for 
appeal.")/ Delisle v. Avallone, 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (N.M. App. 
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1994) (Because party against whom collateral estoppel was 
asserted "did not claim absence of a full and fair opportunity, 
the issue was not preserved in the proceedings below," and could 
not be argued on appeal.). 
Therefore, even if there were any merit to Images' 
argument regarding whether or not the fraudulent inducement 
issues in the two proceedings were different (and as demonstrated 
below, there is no merit to Images' argument), Images may not 
seek to have the trial court reversed on the basis of such an 
argument raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Images may not seek to have the trial court 
reversed on the basis of newly asserted facts 
which were either absent from, or directly 
contradictory to, the record before the trial 
court. 
Images also attempts to support its argument by 
asserting facts to this Court which were not before the lower 
court at the time it granted summary judgment dismissing the 
fraudulent inducement claims. Images attempts to create the 
illusion of two differences between the fraudulent inducement 
issues in the two proceedings. First, it asserts that the 
alleged "big hitter" misrepresentation was at issue in the M&A 
Litigation, but not in the Affinity Arbitration. However, 
Images' allegation that Macris had made the "big hitter" 
statement did not appear in the case below until long after the 
trial court had already ruled on M&A's collateral estoppel 
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summary judgment motion. "[T]here is no record the trial judge 
had access to [this alleged fact] when deciding the motion at 
issue," and Images may not ask this Court to reverse the trial 
court on the basis of an untimely disclosed "fact." See Govert 
Copier Painting, 801 P.2d at 170. 
Second, Images asserts that Macris' supposed 
representation regarding advertising in the National Enquirer was 
not made until after the Affinity Contract had been executed, and 
that this alleged representation was not at issue in the Affinity 
Arbitration, but only in the MScA Litigation. Appellant's Brief 
at 7, 11, 15, 17, and 21. However, this assertion actually 
contradicts the record before the lower court and cited above, 
where Images repeatedly contended that the alleged representation 
regarding advertising in.the National Enquirer was made prior to 
the execution of either contract, and was an inducement to both. 
Because this Court "consider[s] only the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits properly 
before the trial judge" when reviewing the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment, see Seare, 882 P.2d at 676 n.4, Images clearly 
cannot argue for reversal based upon facts absent from and 
contradictory to the record before the trial court. 
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3. Images may not rely upon a newly alleged "big 
hitters" misrepresentation as a grounds for 
fraudulent inducement. 
Images' "big hitter" contention should be rejected as 
being untimely presented. Even if it had been timely presented 
to the lower court, however, any such vague and indefinite claim 
should have been dismissed because it cannot, as a matter of law, 
support a claim for fraud. It is axiomatic that fraud requires a 
representation concerning a presently existing fact. See Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). A claim of fraud 
cannot be predicated upon expressions of opinion, unfulfilled 
predictions or expectations or erroneous conjectures as to future 
events.10 See Aloha Petroglyph v. Baldwin, Inc., 619 P.2d 518, 
519 (Ha. App. 1980); Hall v. Romero, 685 P.2d 757, 760 (Ariz. 
App. 1984). 
As a matter of law, a statement that Macris intended to 
bring in "big hitters" is not an expression of a presently 
existing fact which can support Images' fraudulent inducement 
claims, and is simply too vague a representation upon which 
10
 In fact, Macris did bring in "big hitters" as he 
represented, including Margie Hunsaker, Glenn Tillotson and the 
Camerons. The Hunsaker distributorship was the biggest and most 
successful downline organization among Images' distributors. See 
Findings at 11, 12, 13, 14 & 17. 
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Images could reasonably have relied.11 Images' "big hitter" 
contention should be rejected. 
4. Collateral estoppel bars Images from 
relitigating- the fraudulent inducement issue. 
As noted above, Images has always contended that 
Macris' alleged misrepresentations regarding Dr. Lyman's 
involvement with the nail systems and National Enquirer 
advertising induced it to enter into both the Affinity Contract 
and the M&A Contract. It now asserts, however, that the 
fraudulent inducement issue litigated in the Affinity Arbitration 
was different from the fraudulent inducement issue below in two 
respects. Images argues that in the Affinity Arbitration, 
the issue was whether Images was fraudulently 
induced by virtue of the [alleged] 
misrepresentation into entering into the 
Affinity [C]ontract . . . . In the instant 
case, however, the issue to be litigated was 
whether Images was fraudulently induced into 
entering the Macris & Associates [Contract]. 
Appellant's Brief at 18.12 
11
 Although M&A's argument on this point was not made 
previously because of the lateness in which Images has asserted 
its "big hitters" argument, this Court may properly consider it. 
An appellate court may affirm the trial court on any proper 
grounds, including grounds argued for the first time on appeal. 
See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988) . 
12
 A diligent search of the record in this matter, reveals 
(a) no source document which can be reviewed to determine what 
precise misrepresentation claims may have been alleged in any 
pleading in the Affinity Arbitration; (b) no amendments to any 
such pleadings; (c) no deposition transcripts; (d) no transcripts 
of arguments, etc. In short, Images presented nothing to the 
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This language is phrased so broadly as to gloss over 
the required analysis. Images' causes of action in the two 
proceedings were of course different, but they shared a common 
constituent factual issue: whether Macris made any material 
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing Images' reliance. 
The arbitrator in the Affinity Arbitration resolved that issue 
against Images by ruling that Macris had "made no 
misrepresentations of material facts to [Images] to induce 
[Images] to enter into the" Affinity Agreement.13 (R. 1197.) 
The trial court correctly held that this prior judgment 
collaterally estopped Images from relitigating this common issue, 
even in the context of a different cause of action. See Searle 
Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) (collateral 
estoppel prevents relitigation of issues resolved in a previous 
suit even though the first suit involved "a different cause of 
action"). 
lower court which supports its current contentions that the 
fraudulent misrepresentation issues were actually different in 
the two proceedings. 
13
 On appeal, Images criticizes the arbitrator's ruling by 
arguing that the ruling is unclear as to whether there were any 
representations, whether they were false, whether they were 
immaterial, or to which representations the arbitrator was 
referring. Appellate Brief at 18. Frankly, it makes no 
difference. If there was no misrepresentation, or a 
misrepresentation was immaterial, or if Images did not reasonably 
rely on any alleged misrepresentation as the arbitrator so held, 
there is no basis for a claim of fraudulent inducement. 
33560 24 
Even if the Court were to accept the factual premise of 
Images' argument (for the sake of argument only), and assume that 
in the Affinity Arbitration Images failed to introduce some of 
the misrepresentations which it now alleges against Macris, that 
failure would not give Images license to relitigate the issue of 
fraudulent inducement. This is because, as a matter of law, 
collateral estoppel applies to "ultimate issues" such as 
fraudulent inducement, and not to mere "evidentiary facts" such 
as the particular representations which might be alleged in an 
attempt to establish fraudulent inducement. Therefore, because 
Images "did in fact litigate an issue of ultimate fact and 
suffered an adverse determination, new evidentiary facts may not 
be brought forward to obtain a different determination of that 
ultimate fact." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment c 
(1982) . 
The distinction between "ultimate issues" and 
"evidentiary facts" is illustrated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments as follows: 
A brings an action against B to recover 
for personal injuries in an automobile 
accident. A seeks to establish that B was 
negligent in driving at an excessive rate of 
speed. After trial, verdict and judgment are 
given for B. In a subsequent action by B 
against A for injuries in the same accident, 
A is precluded from setting up B's negligence 
as a defense, whether or not the alleged 
negligence is based on an assertion of 
excessive speed. It is reasonable to require 
A to bring forward all evidence in support of 
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the alleged negligence in the initial 
proceeding. 
Id. illustration 4. The "ultimate issue" in this illustration is 
B's alleged negligence. Ultimate issues "may not be split . . . 
into pieces. If it has been determined in a former action, it is 
binding notwithstanding the parties litigant may have neglected 
to urge for or against it matters which, if urged, would have 
produced an opposite result." IB James W. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice H 0.443[2] at III. -566 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting Price v. 
Sixth District, 258 P. 387 (Cal. 1927)). Thus, once an ultimate 
issue -- such as negligence or fraudulent inducement -- has been 
litigated to a final judgment, collateral estoppel precludes the 
losing party from relitigating the issue in a subsequent 
proceeding, even if there are additional evidentiary facts which 
might yield a different determination of the ultimate issue, but 
which the losing party failed to introduce in the initial 
proceeding. 
This principle was applied in In re Transocean Tender 
Offer Securities Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D.Ill. 1977). 
The plaintiffs in that case were minority shareholders who, in a 
prior state court action, had asserted state law claims that the 
majority shareholder failed to make "full disclosure" of all 
relevant facts surrounding a tender offer. 427 F. Supp. at 1220, 
The state court found that the majority shareholder had satisfied 
its "full disclosure" obligation, and entered final judgment 
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dismissing the plaintiffs' state law claims. JEd. at 1214, 1220. 
In the subsequent federal action in Transocean, the 
plaintiffs asserted additional evidentiary facts which had not 
been considered in the prior state court action, and on the basis 
of those new evidentiary facts claimed that the offering circular 
contained misstatements and omissions of material fact. Ld. at 
1218. The federal court ruled that both proceedings presented 
the same ultimate issue of "full disclosure," and that the 
plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating that 
issue, even on the basis of new evidentiary facts. Id. at 1222-
23 : 
Having litigated the ultimate issue of full 
disclosure and suffered an adverse 
determination, new evidentiary facts may not 
be brought forward to obtain a different 
determination of that ultimate fact. 
Id. at 1222. 
The principle was even more dramatically applied in 
Yamaha Corp. of America v. U.S., 961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
The plaintiff in that case, "Yamaha-America," was the exclusively 
authorized distributor of "Yamaha" brand products within the 
United States, and the exclusive owner of several U.S. trademarks 
for Yamaha products. 961 F.2d at 248. In a prior action, 
Yamaha-America had brought a claim against an importer of "gray-
market" Yamaha products, i.e., genuine Yamaha products which had 
been manufactured and sold abroad, but were then imported into 
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the United States without the consent of Yamaha-America. Id. 
Yamaha-America claimed that because these gray-market imports 
bore "Yamaha" trademarks, they violated section 42 of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which prohibits the importation of goods 
which "copy or simulate" a U.S. trademark. Ld. at 250. In the 
prior action, the court dismissed Yamaha-America's claim on the 
ground that the gray-market goods were not mere copies or 
simulations within the meaning of the Lanham Act, but were 
"genuine Yamaha items," and that Yamaha-America therefore had no 
cause of action under section 42. Id. at 250-51. 
In a subsequent action on an unrelated matter (i.e. 
challenging a federal regulation) Yamaha-America argued an 
evidentiary fact which it had neglected to introduce in the 
initial proceeding. that the gray-market products were 
physically different in various respects from the Yamaha products 
sold by Yamaha-America Ld at 253 The District Court noted 
that this new evidentiary fact might well have compelled a 
judgment in Yamaha-America's favor in the subsequent action Id. 
at 258. However, the court held that "[O]nee an issue is raised 
and determined, it is the entire issue that is precluded, not 
just the particular arguments raised in support of it in the 
first case . Preclusion cannot be avoided simply by 
offering evidence in the second proceeding that could have been 
admitted, but was not, in the first " Id. at 254-55 (emphasis in 
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original). Therefore, because "Yamaha-America failed properly to 
introduce evidence of 'physical differences' in the [initial 
proceeding], . . . it is precluded from relitigating the issue of 
its rights under section 42 based on this 'new' evidence." 
Id. at 258. See also Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 
496 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1974) (ultimate issue of the 
lawfulness of a license agreement had been litigated in a 
previous action, and the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from 
relitigating that issue, even on the basis of new factual 
allegations had not been considered in the previous litigation); 
Temple of the Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 184-85 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs collaterally estopped from relitigating 
conspiracy issue decided against them in prior action, despite 
plaintiffs' contention that adverse judgment in prior action was 
based upon inadequate record); Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 
131, 136 (10th Cir. 1972) ("If the taxpayer's case was not 
effectively presented at the first trial it was their fault; 
affording them a second opportunity in which to litigate the 
matter, with the benefit of hindsight, would contravene the very 
principles upon which collateral estoppel is based."). 
In the instant case, the ultimate "issue" which was 
litigated to a final judgment in the Affinity Arbitration was 
whether Macris had made any "misrepresentations of material fact 
to [Images] to induce [Images] to enter into an agreement with 
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Images or upon which Images reasonably relied. (R. 1197.) In 
accordance with the principles discussed above, Images cannot 
avoid the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitrator's final 
judgment simply by asserting that there are additional 
evidentiary facts (i.e., additional specific alleged 
representations) which bear on the ultimate issue of fraudulent 
inducement, but which it failed to advance in the Affinity 
Arbitration. 
B. Images' Allegations Of Fraudulent Inducement Were 
Competently, Fully, And Fairly Litigated In The 
Affinity Arbitration. 
Images argues that because its fraudulent inducement 
claim in the Affinity Arbitration was dismissed on Affinity's 
motion for summary judgment, the claim "was not afforded a 
competent, full and fair -litigation." Appellant's Brief at 19. 
This is the only collateral estoppel argument which Images ever 
raised before the trial court, and thereby properly preserved for 
this appeal. Images, however, does not contend, much less does 
it cite to any portion of the record to show that it was 
prevented from filing affidavits in opposition to Affinity's 
summary judgment motion in the Affinity Arbitration, nor that it 
was not allowed to present any argument it desired, nor that 
there was any other particular deficiency in the presentation or 
argument of that summary judgment motion. Rather, Images bases 
its argument on the simple proposition that because summary 
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judgment is, by its very nature, resolved without an "evidentiary 
hearing," Appellant's Brief at 19-20, it is per se inadequate to 
support collateral estoppel. 
This is a novel and unsound theory. The clear rule is 
that final judgment pursuant to a motion for summary judgment is 
given the same collateral estoppel effect as final judgment 
following a trial. See Dicken v. Ashcroft, 972 F.2d 231, 233 n. 
5 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established that summary judgment 
is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res 
judicata."); Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561, 568 (Colo. 1989) 
(summary judgment accorded collateral estoppel effect); Creed 
Tavlor, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) ("Issues decided upon a motion for summary judgment may be 
accorded the same preclusive effect as issues decided following a 
trial."); Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 4444, at 391-92 (1981) ("Both claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion result from summary judgments that rest on the lack of 
any genuine issue of material fact going to the merits of claim 
or defense."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d, 
illus. 10 (1982) (final judgment on a motion for summary judgment 
in a prior proceeding is given collateral estoppel effect).14 
14
 See also James L. Saohier Agency, Inc. v. Green, 190 F. 
Supp. 713, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("A decision by arbitrators is as 
binding and conclusive under the doctrine of res judicata and 
estoppel as the judgment of a court."). 
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Therefore, the trial court correctly held that, as a result of 
the final judgment dismissing Images' fraudulent inducement claim 
in the Affinity Arbitration, Images was collaterally estopped 
from relitigating that issue below. 
The only authority which Images cites in support of its 
argument on appeal is Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) . That case, however, never 
mentions collateral estoppel, and does not discuss whether 
summary judgment is "competent, full and fair litigation11 for 
purposes of collateral estoppel. Rather, the plaintiffs in that 
case claimed to have been injured by Salt Lake City Corporation's 
flood-control activities. 784 P.2d at 459. The trial court 
granted summary judgment to the city on the ground that all of 
the city's flood-control•activities were protected by 
governmental immunity. 784 P.2d at 460. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed in part, holding that governmental immunity extends only 
to the city's "policy" decisions regarding "the design, capacity, 
and construction of" its flood control system, but not to "the 
operation and maintenance" of the system. 784 P.2d at 463-64. 
The Utah Supreme Court then held that because the trial court 
decided the case "on a motion for summary judgment, no full and 
adequate evidentiary hearing was held to resolve critical facts" 
regarding whether the challenged flood-control activities were 
immune "policy" decisions, or actionable "operational" decisions. 
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784 P.2d at 464. The court remanded the case to the trial court 
for fact-finding on this question. Jd. Thus, Rocky Mountain 
held only that the summary judgment hearing in that case had not 
"resolve[d] critical facts" necessary to determine the proper 
scope of governmental immunity. Xd. In no way does the case 
support Images' assertion that summary judgment is somehow per se 
inadequate to support collateral estoppel. 
Thus, as to the first issue on appeal, Images failed to 
demonstrate that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
address the fraudulent inducement issue in the Affinity 
Arbitration. Its current attack on the collateral estoppel 
summary judgment is "too little, too late." It failed to make 
appropriate and necessary arguments when it had the opportunity 
and obligation to do so .(assuming that there were any actual 
grounds for making such claims). It has failed to create a 
proper record and has misstated the record. It relies upon 
matters never presented to the lower court. Finally, it relies 
upon a misrepresentation which, as a matter of law, cannot 
support a claim of fraud. For all these reasons, the lower 
court's dismissal of Images' fraudulent inducement claims on the 
grounds of collateral estoppel should be affirmed. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE ACTIONS OF MACRIS 
WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MACRIS & ASSOCIATES AND THAT 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES IS NOT MAORIS' ALTER EGO SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 
A. Images' Claims Should Be Rejected Because It Has 
Failed To Marshal All The Evidence Supporting The 
Trial Court's Findings. 
Images has failed in its burden on appeal to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's alleged 
erroneous findings. Images contests twelve of the trial court's 
fifty-eight findings of fact. To support those findings, Images 
provides only eight citations to the record which it concludes 
are mainly the self-serving testimony of Macris,15 see Appellate 
Brief at 26, but ignores numerous others. 
The challenging party must marshal all relevant 
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings 
and then demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989). 
Where an appellant has failed to adequately marshal this 
evidence, the trial court's findings must be affirmed. Grahn v. 
Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 
793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1990). 
15
 Of course, the trial court was free to believe Macris' 
and others' "self-serving" testimony over that of Images' 
witnesses. 
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Appellants must begin by undertaking an arduous and 
painstaking marshalling process, and after marshalling all of the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, appellants must 
then demonstrate that these same findings are "so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence," thus, 
making them clearly erroneous. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. 
v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989). As explained in 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.: 
[T]he marshalling concept does not reflect a 
desire to merely have pertinent excerpts from 
the record readily available to a reviewing 
court. The marshalling process is not unlike 
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshalling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must 
be sufficient to convince the appellate court 
that the court's findings resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. (Emphasis 
added.) 
818 P.2d at 1315. 
Since one of Images' principle complaints is that the 
trial court had no valid evidence to find that M&A was not the 
alter ego of Macris, the following summary of evidence will 
demonstrate Images' failure to marshal evidence in support of the 
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trial court's findings that M&A was legally separate and distinct 
from Macris, Affinity, or other corporations with which Macris 
was affiliated: 
1. Tom Mower, President of Images, Inc., in June, 
1989, signed the first contract to provide a nail 
and gel system with Affinity, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, with Mike Macris acting as Affinity's 
president. (R. 5166.) 
2. In August, 198 9, Tom Mower signed the 
Distributorship Agreements and the auto-
qualification addendum with Macris & Associates, 
Inc., a Utah corporation with Mike Macris signing 
as secretary. (Trial Exhibits 1 & 2.) 
3. In order to clarify internal records of Images, 
Inc., Tom Mower added "Inc." to Macris & 
Associates in order to insure that Macris & 
Associates' corporate formalities were observed 
and to correct Images' records. (R. 5459, 4670.) 
4. Tom Mower, at all relevant times in this 
litigation, was himself the principal officer and 
director of at least three separate corporations 
and knew of the significance of dealing with 
separate corporate entities. (R. 5460.) 
5. Tom Mower knowingly dealt with Affinity, Inc., and 
Macris & Associates, Inc., and never asked to see 
corporate documents or never questioned the 
separateness of each entity. (R. 5457-58.) 
6. Trial Exhibit 34 - the first downline report -
came in the name of Macris & Associates, Inc., as 
did all ensuing monthly reports. 
7. During 1990, Tom Mower sent letters related to gel 
testing to Affinity, Inc., attention Michael 
Macris, demonstrating Mower's awareness of 
Affinity's separateness from Macris & Associates, 
Inc. (R. 884-888 and Trial Ex. 55.) 
8. Plaintiff demonstrated that it held corporate 
meetings, took minutes, filed separate tax 
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returns, kept separate checking accounts. (See 
Trial Exhs. 88, 89/ R. 4668.) 
9. Valerie Macris testified that she, not Mike 
Macris, became the sole shareholder, kept minutes, 
ratified contracts and kept separate accounts and 
filed separate tax returns for Macris & 
Associates, Inc. (See Trial Exhs. 40, 42/ R. 
5121.) 
10. Others testified that they knew Mike Macris 
operated his distributorship through Macris & 
Associates, Inc., and separated his other 
companies and their duties. (See, e.g., Marge 
Aliparandi testimony, R. 4745.) 
All of the above is more than sufficient for the Court 
to base its findings that M&A is legitimately a separate 
corporate entity whose corporate veil need not be pierced and 
that Macris legitimately operated other businesses without 
creating any undisclosed "fraud" or "inequity" upon Images. 
Instead of marshalling evidence in favor of the court's 
findings, Images' simply re-argues allegations and innuendo in 
support of its position which allegations were soundly rejected 
by the trial court after presentation of extensive evidence. 
B. Images' Assumption That Macris Engaged In 
"Disruptive, Competitive Activity" Is Incorrect. 
Images argues that MScA somehow breached the M&A 
Contract because of Macris' activities on behalf of other 
companies. Images relies upon unsubstantiated assumptions that 
what Macris did as an agent for one company (Emily Rose or 
Affinity) should be attributable to M&A as "disruptive and 
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competitive" behavior, thus, supplying Images with an excuse for 
terminating the M&A Contract.16 That tortured, complex and 
irrational argument also assumes that all of the alleged 
competitive conduct was illegal, disruptive and created a 
legitimate cause for termination of the M&A Contract. 
In fact, however, the trial court made the following 
Findings that are unchallenged by Appellants: 
42. The reasons given by Defendant for terminating 
Plaintiff after already terminating Plaintiff's 
auto qualification status and failing to pay 
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, were all 
pre-textual and without merit, and did not justify 
termination of Plaintiff. (R. 3051.) 
47. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and 
wrongfully terminated Plaintiff's addendum. (R. 
3049. ) 
50. Following Defendant's breach of the contract, 
neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant, 
Macris, was contractually restricted from 
competing with the Defendant. (R. 3049.) 
54. There was not adequate or credible evidence to 
establish that any contracts or potential 
contracts with Defendant were breached as a result 
of either Plaintiff's or Macris' alleged actions. 
(R. 3048.) 
55. There was no adequate or credible evidence to 
establish that either Plaintiff or Macris engaged 
in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully 
interfering with Defendant's existing or potential 
contractual relations. (R. 3048.) 
16
 Macris' relationship with Affinity was known to Images 
through, among other things, Affinity's separate contract to 
supply Images with nail gel and ultraviolet lamp housings. 
Macris' relationship with Emily Rose, Inc. did not commence until 
after Images materially breached the M<kA Contract. 
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See also Findings 51, 52, 53, 56 6c 58; and Memorandum Decision, 
HH 49, 50, 51, 52 Sc 56 wherein the trial court found that none of 
the so-called competitive or disruptive activities took place or 
were improper. Similarly, none of the alleged competitive 
activity has been shown in Appellant's Brief or at trial to be in 
any way improper. 
Plaintiff does not intend to fulfill Appellants' burden 
of properly marshalling the evidence on each of the twelve 
Findings at issue. It is more than sufficient that the lower 
court had voluminous evidence supporting each and every one of 
the contested findings, including hundreds of pages of testimony, 
exhibits and all inferences which were drawn therefrom. 
C. The Trial Court's Conclusion That Maoris & 
Associates Is Not The Alter EQO Of Macris Is 
Correct. 
Images relies upon Utah law allowing the court to 
pierce a corporate veil in order to hold a shareholder personally 
liable if it can be determined that the corporation is the alter 
ego of one or a few individuals, and if observed, the corporate 
form would sanction "a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an 
inequity." Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah 
App. 1994). Yet, once again, Images engages in assumptions and 
presumptions not found in this record. 
Images presumes that whatever conduct Macris engaged 
in, either through his various legal corporate entities or 
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individually, constituted a "fraud or an injustice." Nowhere, 
however, does Images suggest what that fraud is or the nature of 
the injustice. Images appeals the trial court's finding that M&A 
is not the alter ego of Macris, individually. Images is not 
attempting to pierce a corporate veil in order to collect a 
judgment against Macris, nor does it suggest how a fraud is being 
perpetrated by the observance of a separate legal entity. 
Corporations are generally regarded as separate and 
distinct from its shareholders. Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 
370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973). This is true even when the 
corporation only has one stockholder. Coleman v. Coleman, 743 
P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) . The corporate veil, which protects 
shareholders from individual liability for corporate debt will 
only be pierced reluctantly and cautiously. Ramsey v. Adams, 603 
P.2d 1025 (Kan. App. 1979). 
Images incorrectly assumes that Macris, the individual, 
is the alter ego of each and every one of his corporations, and, 
accordingly, each corporate act becomes the corporate and 
individual act of every other corporation with which Macris is 
associated. The general rule is that separate corporations are 
separate legal entities and this is not destroyed by simple 
common ownership. Institutional Laundry v. Utah State Tax Comm., 
706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985). 
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Unless some conspiracy has been alleged, and none has, 
courts do not attribute one person's actions with every other 
entity in the world with which it is associated. For these 
reasons alone, Images' arguments must fail. 
D. Images May Not Complain Of Any Alleged Competitive 
Activity By Macris Or M&A Because Images 
Materially Breached The M&A Contract. 
Cutting through all of Images' painful efforts to 
create an applicable issue regarding Macris' agency status or the 
alter ego status of his companies is Finding No. 50. That 
unchallenged finding renders Images' alter ego/agency arguments 
moot. Even if Macris was the agent of Affinity and/or Emily Rose 
and even if he engaged in competitive conduct, he, M&A, Emily 
Rose or any other company with which he was associated was free 
to compete with Images. -As stated in Finding No. 50: "Following 
Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor Third-
Party Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from 
competing with the Defendant." 
Because Images fails to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings regarding Macris agency/alter ego 
questions, fails to show any improper activity and fails to 
appeal the trial court's Finding No. 50 which renders such 
questions moot, the trial court's Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
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III. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A 
MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING WILLIAM CRISMON 
M&A filed a Motion in Limine to exclude seven witnesses 
from testifying at trial who had not been named as witnesses by 
the discovery cut off date, December 1, 1994, as ordered by the 
trial court. M&A relied upon Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which provides that a court may make such 
orders in regard to a party's failure to abide by discovery 
orders, including a refusal to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or prohibiting him from 
introducing designated matters into evidence. 
Images relies upon Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad, 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992) for the 
proposition that absent an order compelling responses to 
discovery, the trial court abuses its discretion in granting a 
motion to exclude witnesses from testifying at trial. The 
procedural facts are clearly distinguishable in this matter from 
Berrett, because the court had issued a discovery order and also 
because the trial judge changed its original ruling. 
On June 2, 1993, M&A served its Third Set of 
Interrogatories on Defendants requesting an identification of 
witnesses to be called at trial. Images responded that it had 
not yet determined who would be called at trial. On August 10, 
1994, in preparation for a September 6, 1994 trial, Images 
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supplemented its answer to the Third Set of Interrogatories to 
include their trial witness list. 
Due to a conflict with the lower court's schedule, 
trial was continued and discovery was re-opened by order of the 
court until December 1, 1994. (See Court Order, R. 2621-2622, 
copy attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 4.) Thereafter, on 
September 13, 1994, Images' witness list was again supplemented, 
but failed to identify William Crismon as a trial witness. 
On January 11, 1994, more than one month after the 
Court ordered discovery cut-off, Images served a new supplemented 
response which added seven new fact witnesses to be called at 
trial. 
A. Defendants' Supplemental Witness List Violated The 
Court Order. 
Plaintiff had experienced significant difficulty in 
obtaining answers to legitimate discovery requests.17 Previous 
motions to compel discovery had been filed, argued and 
subsequently granted. Aware of this history, the trial court 
issued its Order dated September 16, 1994 that Images supply a 
witness list by that date and that additional discovery would be 
cut-off as of December 1, 1994. (R. at 2621.) 
17
 See Motion to Compel dated December 14, 1991 (R. 2562-
2564); Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Order 
Compelling Discovery dated July 8, 1992, Motion in Limine dated 
August 26, 1994 and Motion in Limine dated February 1, 1995 (R. 
at 2608). 
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Of the seven new witnesses, Images voluntarily withdrew 
three names. After full argument, the trial court granted M&A's 
motion as to Tom and William Crismon and Susan Franceschi, but 
denied the motion as to David Floor. (R. 4940.) 
Clearly, the trial court retains broad discretion in 
the management of its trials, and proceedings. Shepherd v. 
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994). While the 
exclusion of evidence and witnesses is a harsh remedy, it is one 
that, under proper circumstances, can be used to sanction non-
complying parties and control case management. The trial court 
premised its rulings upon Images' admission that Images knew of 
the existence of some witnesses well before the discovery cut-off 
date, had taken their depositions (see R. 4939), and yet failed 
to timely inform M&A of its intention to use these witnesses at 
trial. 
B. Any Exclusion Of William Crismon's Testimony Was 
Not Error. 
Images stipulated that it did not intend to use those 
witnesses for any purpose other than as already disclosed in 
discovery depositions (R. at 4935). Images did not, however, 
proffer the nature or need for such evidence to the trial judge 
who could have exercised an opportunity to weigh the nature and 
necessity of the testimony. This is in stark contrast to other 
occasions in which proffers had been made to the trial court. 
(See, e.g., R. 5591-96.) 
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Between the trial court's ruling on February 21, 1995 
and the last day of trial, March 27, 1995, the trial court 
apparently changed its rulings and allowed rebuttal testimony 
from two of the three witnesses it had earlier excluded: Susan 
Franceschi and Tom Crismon (R. 5623-5628), the latter, through 
his deposition testimony taken on March 23, 1995. 
Impliedly, the testimony of William Crismon would have 
been cumulative and no different than that of his brother, Tom 
Crismon, with whom he purportedly entered into a pre-
incorporation agreement with Macris on April 9, 1991, one month 
after M&A's auto-qualification agreement was terminated. (R. at 
5624.) During cross-examination, Mr. Tom Crismon testified that 
even though he tried to determine a specific date of his meeting 
with Macris prior to signing the pre-incorporation agreement, he 
could not. The only purpose of this testimony was to argue that 
Macris, operating on behalf of the Emily Rose Company, began 
"competing" in a marketing company before the termination of 
M&A' s auto-qualification agreement on or about March 11, 1991. 
The evidence, however, did not support Images' theory. 
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion by 
limiting this same testimony from Tom Crismon's brother, William 
Crismon, the error is harmless since the Court found, and 
appellant does not contest, the following findings: 
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Macris & Associates' agreement with Images 
were materially breached on March 11, 1991. 
See Finding No. 37. 
Mike Macris, his associated entities and 
Macris & Associates, Inc., were under no 
legal duty or restraint not to compete. See 
Finding No. 50. 
There was no credible evidence that Macris & 
Associates competed or interfered with any of 
Images' economic opportunities. See Finding 
No. 53. 
The trial court having modified its prior exclusionary 
rulings concerning the testimony of Susan Franceschi, Thomas 
Crismon and William Crismon from this trial, Images then had a 
duty to preserve its record under Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and to at least proffer to the trial judge how 
the addition of William Crismon's testimony would have altered or 
materially advanced this'trial, if at all. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
and . . . (2) in case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. 
Rulings on evidence are not as critical when the trial 
is to the court rather than a jury because it can be assumed that 
the court has, and will use, its superior knowledge as to 
competency and evidentiary effect. Super Tire Market, Inc. v. 
Rollins, 417 P.2d 132 (Utah 1966). Images can show no 
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prejudicial error resulting from the exclusion of William 
Crismon's testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on 
the fraudulent inducement claims on the grounds of collateral 
estoppel. Images is not permitted to split basic common facts 
between two separate proceedings and then contend it should be 
allowed to assert claims which it argues were not asserted in one 
of the proceedings. It is also not permitted to raise arguments 
which it had the opportunity to present to the trial court, but 
simply failed to do. 
Images should not be allowed to challenge the trial 
court's alter ego/agency findings when it fundamentally failed to 
marshal the evidence and-when the trial court specifically found 
Images materially breached the M&A Contract which findings 
renders the alter ego/agency questions irrelevant. 
Finally, Images should not be allowed to challenge the 
trial court's decision to exclude certain testimony when it 
directly violated the lower court's discovery order in an attempt 
to "surprise" M&A, and even then, when the lower court relented 
during the course of trial, Images made no proffer as to what 
William Crismon's testimony would have been or why it was even 
necessary in light of Tom Crismon's testimony. 
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For all these reasons, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment at the lower court should be 
affirmed and Respondents awarded their costs herein. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 1996. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 S. Main Street, Ste. 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 53 3-83 83 
BY ^?^c^C f?-
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day November, 1996, two copies 
of BRIEF OF APPELLEE was served upon the person named below, at the 
address set out below their name, either by mailing postage 
prepaid, hand-delivery, Federal Express, or by telecopying to them 
a true and correct copy of said document. 
Dennis K. Poole 
Andrea Nuffer 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
4543 South 700 East, Ste. 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
<*1 U.S. Mail 
] Federal Express 
] Hand-Delivery 
] Telefacsimile 
] Other: 
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Jon V. Harper (#1378) 
1349 Bryan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
(801) 597-5022 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
(801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, ] 
Defendants. ) 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., ; 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 910400358 
) Judge Guy R. Burningham 
\ 
N 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 
and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Plaintiff") and Third-
Party Defendant Michael Macris ("Macris") appeared and were represented by counsel Thomas 
R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Defendant") appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, 
Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and 
witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being 
advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah corporation which has been in 
existence since November 1985. 
2. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & Attitude, Inc., is a Utah 
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Macris is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Defendant operated a multilevel marketing business out of Salem, Utah, until 
August 31, 1992, at which time Defendant ceased to operate the multilevel marketing operation 
and transferred it to Neways, Inc. 
5. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant. 
6. Thomas E. Mower ("Mower") founded Defendant and served as its President at 
least through August 31, 1992. Mower is also President of Neways. 
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7. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a 
business by "sponsoring" them and share in the profits that those people bring in by sponsoring 
other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater volume of sales 
upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. There is an incentive 
to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a much greater amount 
because of the volume created by the organization. Encouragement to build "width" is usually 
a part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus 
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also 
continue to grow. One incentive is to "sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the 
money eventually grows through the duplicating efforts of "building the business." 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement which waived the normal 
requirements for ordinary distributors. Plaintiff was considered to have special expertise and 
connections that would benefit Defendant, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. 
As an incentive and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant's organization and sponsor some 
of Plaintiffs connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under it marketing plan, pursuant 
to an "Addendum to Distributor Application," with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate 
objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing 
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." The 
language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted by Macris on the Plaintiffs 
Addendum at Mower's request, changing the wording of the second hand-printed phrase as 
follows: "As long as Distributor is active in promoting Images and Images products." 
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9. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate objective," but progress was 
being made during the time the parties were working together. Similarly, no criteria were 
established to determine what was meant by being "active in promoting Images and Images 
products." 
10. The Distributor Application and the Addendum to Distributor Application together 
became the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
11. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker Aliprandi ("Hunsaker") into Defendant and 
assisted her in building her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the 
parties' contract. 
12. Plaintiff and Hunsaker agreed verbally at the time they executed the Addendums 
that they would work together to build the width of the Hunsaker distributorship to the 
Presidential level of Defendant's marketing plan before building out Plaintiffs organizational 
width. Images was aware of the agreement to build out Hunsaker's distributorship first. 
Defendant was also aware that Plaintiff placed distributors under the Hunsaker distributorship 
rather than directly under its own distributorship. Defendant was aware of this procedure by 
its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 1991. 
13. Plaintiff introduced Glenn Tillotson ("Tillotson") to Defendant. Tillotson had 
significant experience in building a large multilevel marketing organization. Tillotson assisted 
in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant. 
14. Plaintiff also recruited Haydon and Joanne Cameron (the "Camerons") into 
Defendant. Haydon Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing and in placing 
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articles and advertisements in the national media concerning multilevel marketing opportunities 
and products. 
15. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of its activity from August 1989 
through March 1991, in "promoting Images and Images products." The evidence shows that 
Plaintiff was active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products by attending meetings, 
recruiting individuals, promoting Defendant's products, developing marketing strategies, training 
and motivating other distributors for Defendant, consulting with Defendant on ways to improve 
its marketing plan, and travelling for Defendant. Plaintiff expended money, including financial 
support to a down line distributor for travel expenses, to accomplish these activities. 
16. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images and 
Images products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its contract 
with Defendant which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of Defendant's marketing 
plan and to maintain its status as distributor for Defendant. Throughout the period from August 
1989 until March 1991, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the highest level of Defendant's marketing 
plan, according to the Addendum. 
17. In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard work 
of Hunsaker and Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first distributorship in 
Defendant's organization to achieve the presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12 
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during the 
period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the multilevel 
marketing operation. 
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18. In spite of Plaintiffs activity level in the first half of 1990, Defendant notified 
Plaintiff in an undated letter received on April 27, 1990, that its autoqualification status under 
the Addendum to Distributor Application was being terminated. This termination notice was 
sent at a time when Plaintiffs earnings from its distributorship were increasing significantly (as 
was anticipated in the bargain) and meant that Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand 
dollars less than it should have been under the Addendum. 
19. Plaintiff immediately contacted Mower in his hotel room in California and 
complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the Addendum. 
Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination. 
20. In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to 
experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail gel. 
21. In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Macris, on behalf of 
Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") - a company in which Macris was involved but which was separate 
and distinct from Plaintiff and had its own contractual relationship with Defendant as a supplier -
- had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the gels without 
irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were appropriate. 
22. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who had tried various gel 
samples for Affinity even before becoming a distributor for Defendant. Affinity also provided 
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity 
also provided gel samples to Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and various distributors 
to try the samples. 
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23. In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Maoris Affinity," Mower, 
on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to distributors to test before 
Defendant had seen the new gels. Mower explained that he had not seen Affinity's new gel but 
had heard about it from distributors. Mower requested that Affinity not supply any gels to 
Defendant's distributors to sample unless Defendant was also given the gels. 
24. Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Maoris, on behalf of Affinity, always 
provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributor sampled the gel. 
25. Defendant also began testing its own new gels on its distributors, including on 
Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds — the two distributors who tried Affinity's new gels. Hunsaker 
reported to Mower her impressions of any new gel she tried for Affinity. Mower never 
instructed her not to test or sample Affinity's gels. 
26. Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to any of Defendant's 
distributors. 
27. In June 1990, Defendant hired Macris to serve as National Sales Director. As 
part of his compensation, Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of Defendant's gross 
sales. 
28. Mower told Macris that, because he was the principal person operating Plaintiffs 
distributorship, while he served as National Sales Director, Plaintiff would be deemed to be 
active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products under the Addendum, stating "it's all 
the same." 
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29. In early August 1990, Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with 
Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised 
commission and business practices of Defendant. 
30. In response, Defendant sent Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, terminating him 
effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated that it would not pay Macris the promised 
commission on all of its sales — only on sales in the United States. 
31. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the month 
of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs downline. Plaintiff 
sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the intentional deletion of 
this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the downline. 
32. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by Defendant caused additional 
difficulties between the parties including the need for attorney involvement demanding payment 
and delivery of monies due. 
33. On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's 
headquarters with Mower, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade Defendant to 
release a check being held by Defendant payable to Plaintiff. 
34. In the November 7, 1990 meeting, several matters were discussed in addition to 
the above matter, including a request by Mower for a new addendum with Plaintiff. The new 
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach the presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line 
to Plaintiff) within two years. Plaintiff indicated that it would consider the proposal, which 
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Mower was to memorialize in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered to 
Plaintiff. 
35. The parties continued to have difficulties and discussed new agreements into 
January 1991. The parties were never able to agree to new terms. Defendant insisted upon 
imposing a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve presidential 
status, and imposing a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to terminate 
Plaintiffs distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite activity at the 
higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new 
consideration was offered by Defendant to Plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was unwilling 
to agree to the higher standard of "active" and the termination terms being proposed. 
36. At the time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to 
replace the Addendum, both parties were aware that Plaintiffs earnings were going to increase 
dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement. 
37. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by Plaintiff on March 
11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification status of 
the distributorship for lack of activity. There was no mention of any other basis for Defendant's 
action in that letter. Based upon the level of activity of Plaintiff, this act constituted a material 
breach of the contract between the parties, by the Defendant. 
38. Plaintiff fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract and had been "active in 
promoting Images and Images products." 
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39. At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing 
dramatically. 
40. Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs 
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds for 
terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to Defendant's 
distributors. 
41. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs 
autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant 
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The 
reasons given were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the 
Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. The evidence did 
not support the stated reasons for termination, all of which were without merit. Plaintiff had 
not engaged in conduct which violated Plaintiffs policies and procedures or the contract. 
42. The reasons given by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff after already terminating 
Plaintiffs autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, 
were all pretextual and without merit, and did not justify termination of Plaintiff. 
43. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay Plaintiff 
for the month of February 1991, or thereafter. 
44. The money not paid by Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted 
Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff. 
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45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach of 
its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for the 
month of February 1991, which amount the Court has already entered partial summary judgment 
in favor of the Plaintiff. 
46. Also as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach 
of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages for amounts which Defendant should 
have paid to Plaintiff for subsequent months, from March 1991 through August 1992, when 
Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation. Defendant has stipulated to the following 
amounts for those months: 
March 1991 
April 1991 
May 1991 
June 1991 
July 1991 
August 1991 
September 1991 
October 1991 
November 1991 
December 1991 
January 1992 
February 1992 
15,112.33 
22,221.57 
24,865.61 
22,905.35 
27,227.69 
23,913.41 
27,063.79 
28,627.10 
20,890.65 
15,974.44 
18,928.07 
17,854.18 
March 1992 18,122.16 
April 1992 15,911.97 
May 1992 13,364.27 
June 1992 12,692.71 
July 1992 12,103.22 
August 1992 13,263.72 
47. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the 
Plaintiffs Addendum. 
48. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, Plaintiff would have received 
payments of $360,681.20 through August 31, 1992. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs damages 
through August 31, 1992 as a result of Defendant's breach. 
49. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they came 
due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of February 
16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and interest on the 
judgment at the rate of 9.22 % after the date judgment is entered. 
50. Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor Third-Party 
Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant. 
51. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Plaintiff breached 
its contract with Defendant. 
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52. Maoris's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose were not done either 
as an agent or representative for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff never had any contractual relationship 
with Emily Rose. 
53. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris interfered with Defendant's contractual relations or potential contractual relations, or that 
either Plaintiff or Macris interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations. 
There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Defendant was injured or damaged 
by any alleged acts of interference by either Plaintiff or Macris. 
54. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that any contracts or 
potential contracts with Defendant were breached as a result of either Plaintiffs or Macris's 
alleged actions. 
55. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris engaged in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully interfering with Defendant's 
existing or potential contractual relations. 
56. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an 
improper purpose which predominated over any other purpose, or that either Plaintiff or Macris 
used improper means to intentionally interfere with Defendant's existing or potential economic 
relations. 
57. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Macris & 
Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of 
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Macris & Associates, Inc. There was ample evidence that adequate corporate formalities were 
met and that each maintained their separate legal personalities. 
58. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that observance of the 
corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice or 
resulted in an inequity. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The following Conclusions of Law are in addition to those Findings of Fact set forth 
hereinabove which may be properly characterized as Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Distributor Application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the Addendum 
thereto constituted a single integrated contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. Based on Plaintiffs level of activity, Plaintiff, at all times relevant, was "active 
in promoting Images and Images products." Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of 
the contract between the parties until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract. 
3. Defendant materially breached the contract between the parties when it suspended 
Plaintiffs autoqualification status for lack of activity, through its letter dated March 7, 1991. 
4. Defendant also materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased 
paying Plaintiff under the contract between the parties. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's material breach(es), Plaintiff 
suffered damages through August 31, 1992 in the stipulated amount of $360,681.20, plus pre-
judgment interest thereon in the amount of $116,087.49 as of February 16, 1995. After 
February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82. 
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6. Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third-Party Defendant, nor is Third-Party 
Defendant the alter ego of Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the 
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant would not 
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice or result in an inequity. Therefore, Defendant's First 
Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit 
or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Plaintiff performed according to all of the conditions of its contract with 
Defendant until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially 
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of Action, based on breach of 
contract, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
8. Based on Defendant's stipulation during the trial of this matter, by and through 
their counsel, Defendant's Third Cause of Action, based on defamation, was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
9. Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff of Third-Party Defendant 
intentionally induced any third party, including any of Defendant's distributors, to breach a 
contract with Defendant which, as a direct or proximate result, injured or cause damage to 
Defendant. As such, Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant, based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal 
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
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10. Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff or Third-Party Defendant 
intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, thereby injuring or causing damage to Defendant. As such, 
Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on 
intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and shall be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Neither Plaintiffs nor Third-Party Defendant's acts or omissions complained of 
in any of Defendant's causes of action were the result of willful or malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and 
disregard of, the rights of others and, therefore, Defendants are not entitled to any punitive 
damages. Therefore, Defendant's Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant, based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
12. Plaintiffs claims are not barred by (1) the statute of frauds, (2) the parol evidence 
rule, or (3) the doctrines of laches, waiver or estoppel as Defendants' claimed in the Answer to 
Second Amended Complaint. 
13. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief 
was dismissed with prejudice at trial. 
16 
14. Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the 
Joann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Plaintiffs motion and 
Defendant's stipulation. 
15. Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the 
car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs 
stipulation. 
16. Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade 
practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial. 
The foregoing findings and conclusions are cross-adopted to the extent a conclusion has 
been misidentified as a finding or a finding has been misidentified as a conclusion. 
DATED this day of <^-4f^+~£<A~, 1995. 
BY THE COURTS / - k - ^ g ,A 
^ 
Judgetjuy R^Burmngham 
APPROVED BY: S^ , ; ' ^ $ 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES ***££**£"' 
Dennis K. Poole 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTk H: < * > 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
%. 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
CASE NO. 910400358 
DATE: JUNE 6, 1995 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
~7T-
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 
22, 24, and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by 
counsel Thomas R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and 
Nancy Mismash. The Third-Party Defendant appeared and was represented by Thomas R. 
Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Court thereupon heard evidence by 
the parties and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and 
exhibits and upon being advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah Corporation. 
n o r * A 
2. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Images & Attitude, Inc. is a Utah 
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Third-Party Defendant, Mike Macris is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
4. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff. 
5. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff operated a multilevel marketing business out 
of Salem, Utah at times pertinent to this matter. 
6. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a 
business by " sponsoringH them and share in the profits that those people bring in by 
sponsoring other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater 
volume of sales upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. 
There is an incentive to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a 
much greater amount because of the volume created by the organization. One incentive is to 
"sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the money eventually grows through the 
duplicating efforts of "building the business." Encouragement to build "width" is usually a 
part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus 
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also 
continue to grow . In this action, Plaintiff was not paid very much money in the early 
months, when it worked the hardest on its distributorship. 
7. Plaintiff and Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff entered into an agreement 
which waived the normal requirements required of ordinary sponsors. Plaintiff was 
considered to have special expertise and connections that would benefit the Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. As an incentive 
and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant organization and sponsor some of its 
connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under its marketing plan, pursuant to an 
"Addendum to Distributor Application", with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate 
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objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing 
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." 
The language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted on the Joanne Cameron 
addendum by Mr. Thomas Mower and inserted on the Macris & Associates and Margie 
Hunsaker addendum by Mike Macris at Mr. Mower's request. 
8. The arrangement seemed to have worked without major problems from August 
1989 through March 7, 1991. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate 
objective," but progress was being made during the time the parties were working together. 
9. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker into Defendant and assisted her in building 
her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the parties contract. 
10. Plaintiff used its efforts to build the Hunsaker organization, before it developed 
its own organizational width, which was the agreement of the parties. Defendant was aware 
of this procedure by its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 
1991. 
11. Plaintiff introduced an individual named Glenn Tillotson to the Defendant 
organization. Mr. Tillotson had significant experience in building a large multilevel 
marketing organization. Although Mr. Tillotson did not personally join Defendant 
organization, he assisted in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant. 
12. Haydon and Joanne Cameron are individuals Plaintiff recruited into Defendant. 
At the time of recruitment, Mr. Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing 
and in placing articles and advertisements in the national media regarding multilevel 
marketing opportunities and products. 
13. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of "actively promoting" 
Defendant's products from August 1989 until 1991, when Defendant terminated Plaintiff. 
Meetings were attended, individuals were recruited, products were promoted, training, 
motivation, and travel were accomplished by the Plaintiff. The expenditure of money was 
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made by the Plaintiff to accomplish these activities. These activities were done by the 
Plaintiff to promote Defendant and Defendant's products. 
14. At all times relevant to this action Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images 
and Images' products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its 
contract with the Defendant, which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of 
Defendant's marketing plan. 
15. In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard 
work of Margie Hunsaker and Glenn Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first 
Images distributorship to achieve the Presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12 
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during 
the period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the 
multilevel operation. 
16. In an undated letter, received by the Plaintiff April 27, 1990, Defendant 
notified the Plaintiff that its autoqualification status under the addendum to distributor 
application was being terminated. This termination notice was sent at a time when the 
earnings of Plaintiff were increasing significantly (as was anticipated in the bargain) and 
Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand dollars less than it should have been under 
the addendum agreement. 
17. Plaintiff immediately contacted Thomas Mower in his hotel room in California 
and complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the 
addendum. Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination. 
18. In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to 
experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail 
gel. 
19. In an attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Mike Macris, on behalf 
of Affinity, Inc., had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the 
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gels without irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were 
appropriate. 
20. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Margie Hunsaker, who had tried various 
gel samples for Affinity even before becoming an Images distributor. Affinity also provided 
samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity also 
provided gel samples to the Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and distributors to try 
the samples. 
21. In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Macris Affinity," 
Thomas Mower, on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to 
distributors to test before Defendant had seen the new gels. Mr. Mower explained that he 
had not seen Affinity's new gel but had heard about it from distributors. Mr. Mower 
requested that Affinity not supply any gels to Defendant's distributors to sample unless 
Defendant was also given the gels. 
22. Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Mr. Macris, on behalf of Affinity, 
always provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributors sampled the gel. 
23. Defendant also began testing its own gels on its distributors, including Ms. 
Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds. Ms. Hunsaker reported to Mr. Mower her impressions of any 
new gel she tried for Affinity. Mr. Mower never instructed her not to test or sample 
Affinity gels. 
24. Plaintiff never supplied gels to any Defendant distributors. 
25. In June 1990, Defendant hired Mike Macris to serve as National Sales 
Director. As part of his compensation, Mr. Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of 
Defendant's gross sales. 
26. Mr. Mower told Mr. Macris that while he served as National Sales Director, 
Plaintiff would be deemed to be active in promoting Defendant's products under the 
addendum, stating "its all the same." 
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27. In early August 1990, Mr. Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with 
the Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised 
commission and business practices of the Defendant. 
28. In response, Defendant sent Mike Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, 
terminating him effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated they would not pay Mr. 
Macris the commission on all sales, but would on sales in the United States. 
29. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the 
month of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs 
downline. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the 
deletion of this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the 
downline. 
30. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by the Defendant caused 
additional difficulties between the parties including involving attorney involvement 
demanding payment and delivery of monies due. 
31. On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's 
headquarters with Thomas Mower, the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade 
Defendant to release a check being held by Defendant payable to the Plaintiff. 
32. Several matters were discussed in addition to the above matter, including a 
request by Thomas Mower for a new addendum agreement with the Plaintiff. The new 
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line to 
Plaintiff). Plaintiff said he would consider the proposal and Mr. Mower was to memorialize 
it in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered at this meeting. 
33. The parties continued to have difficulties and discuss new agreements into 
January 1991. The parties were never able to come to new terms. Defendant unilaterally 
imposed a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve 
presidential status and imposed a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to 
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terminate the distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite "activity" 
at the higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new 
consideration was offered by Defendant to plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was 
unwilling to agree to the higher standard of "activef,and termination terms being proposed. 
34. At this time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to 
replace the addendum. Both parties were aware that the earnings of Plaintiff were going to 
increase dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement. 
35. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by the Plaintiff on 
March 11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification 
status of the distributorship for lack of activity. Based upon the level of activity of the 
Plaintiff, this act constituted a material breach of the contract between the parties, by the 
Defendant. 
36. Macris & Associates, Inc. fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract. 
37. Defendant ceased making payments pursuant to the contract and 
suspended/terminated the Addendum for Plaintiff, thus breaching the contract. 
38. At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing 
dramatically. 
39. The Defendant warned the Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating the 
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds 
for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested gels or provided gels to Defendant's 
distributors. 
40. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating the autoqualification 
status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant gave Plaintiff 
"formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The reasons given 
were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the Addendum, and 
damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. 
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41. The three reasons given above were all without merit. 
42. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay 
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, or thereafter. 
43. The money not paid by the Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted 
the Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff. 
44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach 
of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for 
the month of February 1991, which amount the court has already entered partial summary 
judgment if favor of the Plaintiff. 
45. The amounts which should have been paid by Defendant to Plaintiff for 
subsequent months are as follows: 
March 1991 
April 1991 
May 1991 
June 1991 
July 1991 
August 1991 
September 1991 
October 1991 
November 1991 
December 1991 
January 1992 
February 1992 
March 1992 
April 1992 
May 1992 
$15,112.33 
22,221.57 
24,865.61 
22,905.35 
27,227.69 
23,913.41 
27,063.79 
28,627.10 
20,890.65 
15,974.44 
18,928.07 
17,854.18 
18,122.16 
15,911.97 
13,364.27 
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June 1992 12,692.71 
July 1992 12,103.22 
August 1992 13,263.72 
46. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the 
Plaintiffs Addendum. 
47. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, the Plaintiff would have received 
payments, based upon the formula of $360,681.20. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs 
damages as a result of Defendant's breach. 
48. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they 
came due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of 
February 16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and 
interest on the judgment at the rate of 9.22% after the date judgment is entered. 
49. Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither the Plaintiff nor Third 
Party Defendant was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant. 
50. Third Party Defendant's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose 
were not done either as agent or representative for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff never had any 
contractual relationship with Emily Rose. 
51. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant interfered with Defendant's 
contractual relations, potential contractual relations, or existing or potential economic 
relations. Defendant has not been damaged by any acts of either the Plaintiff or the Third 
Party Defendant. 
52. Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third Party Defendant, nor is Third Party 
Defendant the alter ego of the Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities. 
53. The Distributor application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the addendum 
thereto constituted an integrated contract between the parties. 
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54. Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of the contract until Defendant 
wrongfully breached the contract, 
55. Defendant failed to establish that any alleged breach of contractual relations by 
Plaintiff or Third Party Defendant injured or caused damage to Defendants. 
56. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant intentionally interfered with or 
procured any breach of any contract with any Defendant distributor or potential distributor. 
57. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant acted maliciously, intentionally, 
recklessly, or fraudulently. Punitive damages would not be appropriate. 
58. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs claims against the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant are without merit or legal basis and will be dismissed with prejudice. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare, serve opposing counsel and submit 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment consistent with this decision. 
Dated this Q? day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
BURNINGHAM^^GE 
cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.; Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
Jon V. Harper, Esq. 
Dennis K. Poole, Esq.; Andrea Nuffer, Esq.; Nancy Mismash, Esq. 
10 
Tab 3 
5? 
<Sr. 
^ 
WRORwer 
-SL A3.T 
Jon V. Harper (#1378) 
1349 Bryan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
(801) 597-5022 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
(801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910400358 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24 
and 27, 1995 and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party 
Defendant Michael Macris appeared and were represented by counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg, 
Jon V. Harper and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & 
Attitude, Inc. appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy A. 
Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and the witnesses in support of 
their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being advised in the premises, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the following 
amounts: (a) $360,681.20, constituting Plaintiffs damages through August 31, 1992, as a result 
of Defendant's breach of its contract with Plaintiff; (b) $126,957.67 constituting pre-judgment 
interest on the principal amount as of June 6, 1995; and (c) per diem pre-judgment interest of 
$98.82 per day from June 6, 1995 until Judgment is entered by this Court (together representing 
the "Judgment Amount"). Following the entry of this Judgment, interest on the Judgment 
Amount shall accrue at the rate of 9.22% per annum. 
2. Defendant's First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
10. Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the 
car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs 
stipulation. 
11. Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade 
practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial. 
DATED: September M , 1995. 
ia BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED BY: 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Dennis K. Poole 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
0620judg.50a 
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3. Defendant's Second Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
4. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action against Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendant, based on defamation, was voluntarily dismissed by Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff at the conclusion of Plaintiffs case at trial and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal basis and 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Defendant' s Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
8. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief 
was dismissed with prejudice at trial. 
9. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the 
Jo Ann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and 
Plaintiffs stipulation. 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 263-3344 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an 
individual, 
Defendants, 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-party Defendant 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910400358 
Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties hereto, and for good 
cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
MACRIS.ORD (EC) 
1. That the discovery cut off in this matter be and is 
hereby extended through December 1, 1994. 
2. That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower 
shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list on or 
before September 16, 1994, which witness list may thereafter be 
supplemented. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine be and is hereby withdrawn, 
without prejudice. 
ORDER DATED this ( (* day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
'Si 
DISTRIC T/COURT JUDGE 
APPROVERS TO FORM: 
THOMAS R. I^RRENBERG 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendants 
/«9- ?? 
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